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OKLAHOMA'S RAPE SHIELD STATUTE: DOES
IT LIVE UP TO ITS NAME?
I. INTRODUCTION
"And will you not more readily infer assent in the practiced Mes-
salina, in loose attire, than in the reserved and virtuous Lucretia?"1 This
oft-quoted remark of Judge Cowen from People v. Abbot 2 reflects the
common law doctrine that a woman's unchastity bears a direct relation-
ship to her credibility as a rape complainant:' a propensity for con-
senting to sexual behavior in the past creates an inference that there was
consent to the intercourse in the present case. Contemporary society,
however, is more tolerant of sexual conduct outside of marriage.4 Be-
cause such behavior is no longer viewed as abnormal, it should not be
relevant to the rape victim's credibility.5 In the 1970's, public outcry
about rape trials becoming inquisitions into the morality of the rape vic-
tim,6 rather than a focus on the rape in question, resulted in the enact-
ment of "rape shield" statutes by a majority of jurisdictions.7
By excluding certain types of evidence, legislators designed these
rape shield statutes to defeat the common defensive ploy in rape trials of
attacking the credibility of the rape complainant by inquiring into her
1. People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192, 195-96 (N.Y. 1838).
2. 19 Wend. 192 (N.Y. 1838).
3. See IA J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 62 (Tillers rev. 1983)
[hereinafter WIGMORE].
4. See Ordover, Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unlamented Death
of Character for Chastity, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 90, 96-102 (1977). One study cited by the author
indicated that among the male population, 81% approved of premarital sex for women and 84%
approved it for men. Id. at 100-01.
5. Id. at 96.
6. Representative Holtzman, sponsor of the federal rape shield statute, commented during
Congressional hearings on the bill that
[t]oo often in this country victims of rape are humiliated and harassed when they report
and prosecute the rape. Bullied and cross-examined about their prior sexual experiences,
many find the trial almost as degrading as the rape itself.... [R]ape trials [have] become
inquisitions into the victim's morality, not trials of the defendant's innocence....
124 CONG. REC. 34, 913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
7. Currently, forty-eight states, the federal government, and the military justice system have
enacted statutes which prohibit or restrict the introduction of prior sexual conduct evidence. Utah
does not have such a statute, and Arizona allows its court system the discretion to determine admis-
sibility of such evidence. See Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A
Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 765 n.3 (1986).
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prior sexual history.8 An unchaste woman was thought to have a charac-
ter flaw because her consent on prior occasions was viewed as an indica-
tor of her present consent. Therefore, as a defense to rape, consent was
inferred by the sexual history of the complainant.9 The "immorality" of
the rape complainant was established through reputation or specific in-
stance evidence. 10 The defense tactic diverted the jury's attention from
the issue of rape. Consequently, the successful use of this tactic resulted
in numerous acquittals, and rape became one of the most unreported
crimes in this country.11
In response to this trend, Oklahoma's legislature hurriedly enacted
its rape shield statute to prevent prejudice to the complaining witness
and to encourage the reporting and prosecution of rape.12 Oklahoma's
statute13 facially mirrors the rationale of protecting the privacy of rape
complainants from undue inquiry. The statute applies equally to prose-
cutions for rape and assaults with intent to commit rape.14 It mandates
that any evidence of opinion or reputation of the rape complainant's sex-
ual conduct is inadmissible if offered to prove her consent.1 5 Further-
more, any evidence as to specific instances of the complainant's sexual
history is also inadmissible. 6 The statute does not preclude evidence of
8. Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 12-14 (1977). "[One gathers that defense counsel not only scrutinize the matter of previous
intercourse but also delve into issues like the victim's use of birth control, her attendance (unes.
corted) at bars, the existence of any illegitimate children, and the number of her prior sexual exper-
iences." Id. at 14.
9. See Ordover supra note 4; Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth
Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. RFv. 544, 545 (1980); Galvin, supra note 7.
10. 124 CONG. Rac. 34, 913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
11. See Berger, supra note 8, at 4-6. The author calculated that while 55,000 rapes and at-
tempted rapes were recorded by the FBI in 1974, the actual incidence of rape and attempted rape
was closer to 550,000. Id. at 5.
12. Representative Bamberger, declaring an emergency, introduced House Bill 1024 as a crimi-
nal procedure act designed to make evidence of a complaining witness' previous sexual conduct
inadmissible for prosecution of rape and attempted rape. Okla. House Journal at 48 (Jan. 7, 1975).
13. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 750 (1981). The statute provides:
A. In any prosecution for rape or assault with intent to commit rape, opinion evidence of,
reputation evidence of and evidence as to specific instances of the complaining witness'
sexual conduct is not admissible on behalf of the defendant in order to prove consent by the
complaining witness. Provided that this section shall not apply to evidence of the com-
plaining witness' sexual conduct with or in the presence of the defendant.
B. If the prosecutor introduces evidence or testimony relating to the complaining witness'
sexual conduct, the defendant may cross-examine the witness giving such testimony and
offer relevant evidence or testimony limited specifically to the rebuttal of such evidence or
testimony introduced by the prosecutor.
Id.
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opinion, reputation, or specific instances if the complainant engaged in
sexual conduct with the accused or in the presence of the accused.17 Ad-
ditionally, if the prosecutor introduces evidence of the complainant's sex-
ual history, then the defense is permitted to introduce evidence in
rebuttal. 18
The legislature's intent in passing this statute was to deny the de-
fendant the opportunity to inquire into the victim's prior sexual history
when it bears little if any relevance to whether the victim was raped in
the present case. However, the Oklahoma rape shield statute raises a
major concern by excluding from trial evidence which may be constitu-
tionally required under the sixth amendment.19 All criminal defendants
are entitled to bring forth evidence in their defense so that they may have
a fair trial.20 While in theory the Oklahoma rape shield statute balances
the privacy concerns of the rape victim against the constitutional con-
cerns of the defendant, in fact the statute is unnecessarily vague and
leaves open too many windows through which a defendant might suc-
cessfully, though incorrectly, introduce evidence of the victim's sexual
past.
II. USE OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE PRIOR TO THE
RAPE SHIELD STATUTE
Before the Oklahoma legislature amended its definition of statutory
rape,2' Oklahoma case law made hair-splitting distinctions between per-
missible and impermissible uses of character evidence. In statutory rape
cases, consent to sexual intercourse is not in issue; however, the previous
chaste and virtuous character of the statutory rape complainant2 2 was
presumed under the old law and was a material element of the charge.
Thus, courts permitted the introduction of specific instance testimony
about the victim's prior sexual history to rebut the presumption.23 Repu-
tation and opinion evidence was not admissible for this purpose.2 4
In forcible rape cases, consent was usually in issue. Defendants
17. Id.
18. Id. at (B).
19. See infra notes 73-115 and accompanying text.
20. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
21. Act approved June 30, 1981, ch. 325, § 1, 1981 Okla. Sess. Laws 1139, (codified as amended
at OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1111 (1981)).
22. "A chaste female is one that has never had sexual intercourse-who yet retains her virgin-
ity. A virtuous female is one who has not had sexual intercourse unlawfully--out of wedlock, know-
ingly and voluntarily." Marshall v. Territory, 2 Okla. Crim. 136, 147-48, 101 P. 139, 143 (1909).
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could introduce evidence about the rape complainant's reputation, but
specific instance testimony about her prior sexual history was not admis-
sible.25 This restriction comported with the traditional doctrine that spe-
cific prior acts should not be admissible to prove conformity by the rape
victim.26 If her sexual history was cast as a character trait, then reputa-
tion evidence was admissible to provide an inference of consent in the
present case.27
A. Statutory Rape
Under Oklahoma territorial and state law, a woman below the age
of eighteen and above the age of sixteen was presumed to have a chaste
and virtuous character.28 As a material element of the crime charged,
courts considered this presumption to be a fact for the jury to deter-
mine," and any evidence which tended to rebut the presumption was
admissible.30
In Marshall v. Territory,3 x the defendant was accused of fathering
the child of the statutory rape complainant. 32 The court permitted the
defendant to introduce evidence that the rape complainant had made vis-
its to the sleeping room of a male acquaintance about nine months prior
to the time that her child was born.33 Evidence was also admitted that
she had lost some of her clothing one evening while on a buggy ride with
a different young man.34 The court required the government to satisfy
"the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the female was of this previous
chaste and virtuous character."35 Accordingly, any evidence of compro-
mising situations or suspicious circumstances which detracted from the
presumptive character presented a heavy burden for the plaintiff to
overcome.
25. See Shapard v. State, 437 P.2d 565 (Okla. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968); see infra
notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
26. See Ordover, supra note 4, at 96.
27. Id.
28. The statute provided in part that "[r]ape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a
female, not the wife of the perpetrator.... [w]here the female is over the age of sixteen years and
under the age of eighteen, and of previous chaste and virtuous character." Rev. Laws of Okla.
(1910), ch. 23 art. 29 § 2414.
29. Marshall v. Territory, 2 Okla. Crim. 136, 151, 101 P. 139, 145 (1909).
30. Id.
31. 2 Okla. Crim. 136, 101 P. 139 (1909).
32. Id. at 153-54, 101 P. at 146.
33. Id. at 151, 101 P. at 145.
34. Id. at 151-52, 101 P. at 145.
35. Id. at 152, 101 P. at 145.
[Vol. 24:137
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The court in Diffey v. State3 6 attempted to shift this burden of per-
suasion away from the government. Although requiring the government
to prove the victim's chaste character beyond a reasonable doubt, the
court required such proof only after the defense introduced evidence
which showed a lack of chastity.37 Thus, the court permitted testimony
to impeach the credibility of the complainant. A friend of the defendant
testified that he had sexual intercourse with the complaining witness
prior to the defendant's relationship with her.38 The court found the
defendant guilty, however, ruling that the jury was able to properly
weigh the evidence.39
This shift in the burden of persuasion did not last long, as the court
in Davis v. State' declined to follow the Diffey standard. The govern-
ment was thereafter required to establish the previous chaste character of
the victim at the outset of the trial.4 '
The dichotomy between using specific instance testimony versus
reputation testimony is best illustrated by the opinion of the court in
Hast v. Territory.42 Here, in hope of disproving the rape complainant's
chastity, the defense presented the testimony of several witnesses regard-
ing their.specific sexual encounters with the victim.43 The court believed
that the jury was "in a much better position to determine ... who was
telling the truth"'  by allowing this specific instance evidence to be intro-
duced. However, the Hast court was adamant in not allowing the de-
fendant to introduce reputation evidence for the purpose of establishing a
previously unchaste character.45 According to the court, a woman's true
character was not always in alliance with her reputation: "The good and
pure are often traduced by bad men and women and suffer in reputation
by reports invented and circulated through motives having their origin in
36. 10 Okla. Crim. 190, 135 P. 942 (1913).
37. Id. at 194, 135 P. at 943.
The law presumes that the female is chaste and virtuous, and this presumption authorizes
the jury to assume at the outset that the prosecutrix was chaste and virtuous. If any evi-
dence is introduced tending to show a want of previous chaste and virtuous character, then
the state is required to establish the previous chaste and virtuous character of the prosecu-




40. 17 Okla. Crim. 604, 191 P. 1044 (1920).
41. Id. at 613, 191 P. at 1047.
42. 5 Okla. Crim. 162, 114 P. 261 (1911).
43. Id. at 180, 114 P. at 269.
44. Id. at 181, 114 P. at 269.
45. Id. at 168-76, 114 P. at 264-67.
1988]
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envy, malevolence and hate." 6 Thus, statutory rape complainants en-
joyed a presumption of a chaste character, but their sexual privacy was
quite open to the public, nonetheless, because of this presumption.
B. Forcible Rape
Forcible rape presented a situation where reputation evidence was
admissible when the forcible rape complainant's prior sexual history was
cast as a character trait.47 If the rape complainant consented in the past,
the theory postulated, consent on the present occasion could be inferred,
based on her character.4" Dean Wigmore strongly advocated using this
evidence of unchastity because men needed to be protected from the
fabricated charges of "errant girls and young women."49 In fact, prior to
the 1970's, several courts agreed that character for unchastity should be
admissible in rape prosecutions.50 The Federal Rules of Evidence pro-
vided the accused with this avenue for admissibility.51
46. Id. at 175, 114 P. at 267. (quoting State v. Prizer, 49 Iowa 531, 32 Am. Rep. 155 (1878)).
47. See Ordover, supra note 4, at 96.
48. "One of these relevant uses is that of the character of a rape-complainant for chastity. The
non-consent of the complainant is here a material element; and the character of the woman as to
chastity is of considerable probative value in judging of the likelihood of that consent .... ." WIG-
MORE, supra note 3, at § 62 (quoting IA J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 62 (3d ed. 1940).
49. 3A J. WIGMORE § 924a at 736 (Chadbourne rev. 1970).
50. State v. Kittle, 85 W. Va. 116, 101 S.E. 70 (1919) (former acts of sexual intercourse were
admitted to show character); Thompson v. State, 160 Ga. 520, 128 S.E. 756 (1925) (previous "im-
moral conduct" was admissible); State v. Wulff, 194 Minn. 271, 260 N.W. 515 (1935) (evidence of
prior sexual acts was admissible when defense was consent); Patterson v. State, 234 Ala. 342, 175
So. 371, 377 (1937) (where state introduces evidence of a woman's venereal disease, prior adulterous
relationships are admissible); State v. Wood, 59 Ariz. 48, 122 P.2d 416, 418 (1942) (any evidence
which reasonably tends to show consent is admissible); Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681
(8th Cir. 1953), rev'd sub. nom. United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1978) (error to
exclude evidence of unchaste acts); Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370, 183 A.2d 359 (1962) (where consent
is in issue, reputation with respect to unchastity is admissible); Crawford v. State, 254 Ark. 253, 492
S.W.2d 900 (1973) (evidence of reputation for unchastity is admissible).
51. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a), character evidence is not admissible to prove con-
formity, but it is admissible to show a character trait of the victim. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) provides in
part:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of [her]
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that [she] acted in conformity there-
with on a particular occasion, except:
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of the victim of the crime offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same ....
Id. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 405 the character of the victim may be proven by reputation or
opinion evidence unless it is a material element of the crime charged. FED. R. EVID. 405 states:
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of char-
acter of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by
testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into rele-
vant specific instances of conduct.
6
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The most influential Oklahoma decision prior to the enactment of
the Oklahoma rape shield statute, Shapard v. State, 2 conformed in part
with this traditional theory by acknowledging that reputation evidence
would be admissible if consent were in issue.53 However, the Shapard
court's decision was influential because it expressly refuted the doctrine
that prior sexual acts made it "more probable that an unchaste woman
would assent to such an act than a virtuous woman."54 Aside from the
court's position regarding reputation evidence, according to Cameron v.
State,5" Oklahoma's legislature essentially codified the Shapard holding
as its rape shield statute. 6
III. OKLAHOMA'S RAPE SHIELD STATUTE
The Oklahoma legislature enacted its rape shield statute57 on March
4, 1975,18 only two months after the act was introduced as an emergency
bill. 9 The statute excludes reputation and opinion evidence of the rape
victim's sexual past to prove consent.6 The statute also excludes specific
instance evidence of the victim's sexual past.61 Only in three narrow in-
stances may the defendant inquire into specific instances in the victim's
past: where there is evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct with
the accused,62 where the victim's past sexual conduct was in the presence
of the accused,63 or where the prosecution introduces evidence of the
victim's past conduct, which the defense is entitled to rebut.
4
Oklahoma's statute is similar to the rape shield statute passed in
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character of a
person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of
specific instances of [her] conduct.
Id.
52. 437 P.2d 565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968).
53. In forcible rape cases, if consent was not in issue, then reputation and specific instance
testimony were to be excluded. If consent was in issue, then only reputation evidence was admissi-
ble. The only time that specific instance testimony was admissible was where the rape complainant
had engaged in sexual activity previously with the accused. Id. at 600.
54. Id. at 601.
55. 561 P.2d 118, 121 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
56. For a contrary view of this assertion, See Kutner, Cameron v. State: Does the Oklahoma
Rape Evidence Statute Prevent Impeachment of a Complaining Witness for Bias or Motive to Falsify?,
30 OKLA. L. Rnv. 905, 920 (1977).
57. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 750 (1985).
58. Okla. House Journal at 367 (Jan. 7, 1975).
59. See supra note 12.




64. Id. at (B).
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California65 and five other jurisdictions.66 These laws exclude the use of
sexual conduct evidence as to either consent or credibility.6 7  The
Oklahoma statute prohibits sexual history evidence as it pertains to
consent.68
The approach adopted by Oklahoma and these other jurisdictions is
perplexing because of the close relationship between evidence regarding
consent and evidence regarding credibility. In other words, in most in-
stances the rape complainant's testimony establishes the element of non-
consent.69 Even where Oklahoma excludes evidence designed to show
consent, this same evidence may be used to impeach the complainant's
credibility. 70 Essentially, any evidence which tends to prove consent will
likewise impeach the credibility of the complaining witness. Conversely,
evidence which impeaches credibility implies consent.7 ' As one author
points out, consent and credibility become "functional equivalents" and
the use of one at trial can essentially circumvent the exclusionary pur-
pose of the other.72
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS AND OKLAHOMA'S STATUTE
In focusing on the defendant's constitutional rights, Oklahoma's
rape shield statute, as an exclusionary provision, raises serious questions
concerning the extent to which a criminal rape defendant may be pre-
cluded from introducing potentially probative evidence. Under the
United States Constitution, all criminal defendants are guaranteed the
right to present a full and fair defense.73 The facial text of the Oklahoma
rape shield law, however, coupled with an inadequate index of its legisla-
tive intent,74 is forcing the Oklahoma courts to judicially interpret the
65. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103(b) (West Supp. 1986).
66. Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3508-09 (1979); Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-3-70 (Supp. 1985); Nevada, NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 48.069, 50.090 (1983); North Dakota, N. D.
CENT. CODE §§ 12.120-14 to -15 (1985); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020 (Supp.
1986).
67. See Galvin, supra note 7, at 894.
68. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 750(A) (1985).
69. See Galvin, supra note 7, at 775-76. The author correctly points out that legislation
designed like Oklahoma's is flawed. "Sexual conduct does not neatly break down into 'consent' or
'credibility' uses." Id.
70. The Oklahoma rape shield statute only provides that reputation, opinion, or specific in-
stance testimony "is not admissible on behalf of the defendant in order to prove consent by the com-
plaining witness." OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 750 (1985) (emphasis added).
71. See Galvin, supra note 7, at 775-76.
72. Id.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
74. Very little of the discussions surrounding the passage of Oklahoma legislation was recorded
at the time of the enactment of the rape shield statute.
[Vol. 24:137
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statute's breadth.75 The categorical ban on reputation and specific in-
stance evidence to prove consent does not address whether this same evi-
dence may be used to impeach credibility.76 While the statute enables
the defendant to rebut sexual conduct evidence introduced by the prose-
cution, there is no mention whether the accused may also use this evi-
dence to prove bias or ulterior motive on the part of the complainant.77
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that every defendant in a criminal prosecution has the right "to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him"'7 8 and "to have compulsory pro-
cess for obtaining Witnesses in his favor."'79  All criminal rape
defendants, therefore, have the right to confront, by way of cross-exami-
nation, any adverse witnesses against them8° as well as to bring forth
evidence in their defense through the compulsory process clause.81
Cross-examination, once called the "greatest legal engine ever dis-
covered for the discovery of the truth,"82 is perhaps the most important
right guaranteed by the confrontation clause.83 The United States
Supreme Court has acknowledged, however, that the right to cross-ex-
amine is not an absolute right, and it may be subordinate to other legiti-
mate interests in the criminal process.84 There is not a right, for
example, to cross-examine on an irrelevant issue8" or to posit questions
designed merely to annoy or harass the witness.86
The Supreme Court has also recognized that the right of criminal
defendants to bring forth witnesses in their defense is a "basic ingredient
of due process of law, ' 87 which "stands on no lesser footing than other
75. See Cameron v. State, 561 P.2d 118 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
76. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
77. Several of the rape shield statutes enacted by other states do not specifically address this
point; however, even among these statutes the draftsmanship and legislative histories indicate con-
cern about this issue. In the federal rape shield statute, for example, courts have used the catchall
provision "where constitutionally required" to introduce testimony regarding bias. FED. R. Evil.
412. Similarly, in California, the legislative history surrounding the credibility provision of that
state's rape shield statute also indicates a concern by the legislature about the use of biased testi-
mony. See Galvin, supra note 7, at 895.
78. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
79. Id.
80. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 248-49 (1895).
81. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967).
82. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
83. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965).
84. Chambers v. Mississippi, '10 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
85. Jenkins v. Moore, 395 F. Supp. 1336 (E.D. Tenn. 1975), aff'd, 513 F.2d 631 (6th Cir.
1975).
86. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694 (1931).
87. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967).
1988]
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Sixth Amendment rights. 8  Yet, like the confrontation clause, the com-
pulsory process clause must accommodate the important state interest of
furthering the truth determining process.8 9
Two United States Supreme Court cases illustrate that certain state
exclusionary rules must yield to the constitutional guarantees of criminal
defendants. 90 In Chambers v. Mississippi,9' the Court held that, when a
state evidentiary rule denies or significantly diminishes the right of con-
frontation, the ultimate integrity of the fact finding process is called into
question, and the competing interest must be closely examined.92 The
defendant in Chambers was charged with murder9 3 and sought to cross-
examine his own witness,94 but Mississippi's common law "voucher" rule
precluded parties from impeaching their own witnesses.95 Additionally,
the defendant wanted to present witnesses in his defense; however, their
testimony was based upon hearsay, and the Mississippi courts would not
allow their testimony at trial.96 The Chambers Court balanced the state's
interests in applying the evidentiary rules "mechanistically" against the
accused's sixth amendment guarantees and found the balance in favor of
the accused.
97
In Davis v. Alaska,98 the Court also applied a balancing test which
weighed the state's interest in protecting the confidentiality of prior juve-
nile records against the accused's need to impeach the credibility of an
adverse witness.99 The defendant in Davis was accused of stealing a safe
from an Anchorage bar." At trial, the prosecution presented a witness
88. Id.
89. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-318 (1974).
90. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
91. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
92. Id. at 295.
93. Id. at 285-88. In this case, a southern Mississippi policeman was attempting to execute a
warrant for the arrest of a youth. A hostile crowd tried to free the youth, and, during the commo-
tion, the officer was mortally wounded by gunfire. Before he died, the officer managed to shoot into
an alleyway, striking the defendant. There was conflicting testimony as to whether the defendant
actually shot the policeman. Before trial, a witness who was later called by the defendant to testify,
signed a confession indicating that he, and not the defendant, killed the policeman. This confession
was later denied before trial. Id.
94. Id. at 295.
95. According to the Court, the voucher rule was a vestige of English trial practice where
"'oath-takers'. .. were called to stand behind a particular party's position in any controversy." Id.
at 296. While a party calling a witness ordinarily "vouches for his credibility," the defendant in
Chambers was calling an adverse witness essential to his defense. Id. at 295-97.
96. Id. at 298.
97. Id. at 302.
98. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
99. Id. at 309-11.
100. Id. at 309-10.
[Vol. 24:137
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who had a prior juvenile record and who was on probation." 1 The de-
fense counsel wanted the juvenile record to be brought out-not to im-
peach the witness for truthfulness, but to ascertain whether the potential
for bias or prejudice existed. 02 The defense counsel was attempting to
show that the witness testified out of fear that his probationary status
would otherwise be jeopardized. 
10 3
Two Alaska statutes precluded admitting this evidence, 3 4 and the
trial court convicted the defendant based upon the witness' testimony. 05
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defense counsel
had ample opportunity to adequately cross-examine the witness for bias
or motive."0 6 The United States Supreme Court overruled, holding that
a "[s]tate's policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile
offender's record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional right
as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness."',
0 7
While criminal defendants are limited in bringing forth evidence in
their defense, the issue for Oklahoma's statute is the extent to which it
may preclude a defendant from bringing forth any relevant evidence.
Certainly, relevant evidence is not admissible when its probative value is
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.' 08 The poor draftsmanship of
Oklahoma's rape shield statute, however, exposes the act to numerous
constitutional infirmities. These infirmities present an opportunity for a
persuasive litigant to defeat the statute's legislative intent.
Cameron v. State,09 a forcible rape case, was the first reported case
to consider the constitutionality of the Oklahoma rape shield statute.
The defendant in Cameron claimed that his opportunity to fully cross-
101. Id. at 310-11.
102. Id. at 311.
103. Id.
104. The Court quoted the Alaska Rule of Children's Procedure 23 which provided that "[n]o
adjudication, order, or disposition of a juvenile case shall be admissible in a court not acting in the
exercise of juvenile jurisdiction except for use in a presentencing procedure in a criminal case where
the superior court, in its discretion, determines that such use is appropriate." Id. at 311 n.1. The
Court also quoted ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(g) (1971) which provided in part: "The commitment
and placement of a child and evidence given in the court are not admissible as evidence against the
minor in a subsequent case or proceedings in any other court .... " Id.
105. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 314 (1974).
106. Id. at 314-15.
107. Id. at 320.
108. FED. R. EvID. 401 states: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more prob-
able or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Id FED. R. EViD. 403 provides that,
"[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id
109. 561 P.2d 118 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
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examine was impermissibly precluded by application of the statute) 10
At trial, defense counsel wanted to cross-examine the complainant about
a prior period of sexual intimacy with a third party who was not her
husband."'I The defense counsel believed that the anger and jealousy of
the complainant's husband resulting from that prior instance motivated
her to charge the defendant with rape in this instance.I"
The court referred to its holding in Shapard 113 and determined that
the cross-examination was merely designed "to embarrass and humiliate
the prosecutrix and discredit her in the eyes of the jury."" 4 The court
upheld the statute's constitutionality and ruled that no evidence estab-
lishing consent between the complainant and the defendant had been
presented. 115
V. UNDECIDED AREAS
While Oklahoma's rape shield statute survived constitutional chal-
lenge in Cameron, there is reason to believe that other areas of inquiry
into the sexual history of the complainant may be allowed by the courts.
Unless the statute is redrafted to incorporate adequate procedural safe-
guards, Oklahoma courts will have to determine, without guidance from
the legislature, the admissibility of several areas of prior sexual history:
whether the defendant had a reasonable belief that the complainant was
consenting based on his knowledge of her sexual history," 6 determining
the source of injury to the complainant, 117 and use of post traumatic
stress disorders by the prosecution. 118
A. Defendant's Reasonable Belief of Consent
In Doe v. United States, "' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rec-
ognized a judicial exception to the federal rape shield statute, reasonable
110. Id. at 121.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Shapard v. State, 437 P.2d 565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967). The Cameron Court stated that:
such cross-examination had no real probative value... its continued use could frustrate
the ends of justice in that victims of rape ... would be subject to the most searching
examination of their prior sexual activities .... [They] would neither report forcible rape
committed against them, nor testify in a prosecution against their attacker.
Cameron, 561 P.2d at 121-22.
114. Id. at 121.
115. Id. at 122.
116. See infra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 131-43 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 144-53 and accompanying text.
119. 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981).
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belief of consent. 120 When evidence is offered solely for the purpose of
establishing the accused's state of mind, it is admissible, subject to the
general relevancy provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence.12' The
Doe court held that prior telephone conversations between the defendant
and complainant were relevant to determine the intent of the defend-
ant.'22 Additionally, a love letter written to another man and shown to
the defendant, as well as the testimony of other men with whom the de-
fendant conversed, were admitted as relevant corroborative evidence.
12 3
This evidence tended to establish the defendant's knowledge of the
complainant's sexual history, which the court determined should be ad-
mitted to determine whether the defendant could reasonably believe that
the complainant was consenting.1 24  According to the court, congres-
sional intent to specifically exclude such evidence when offered solely for
the state of mind of the defendant was not apparent from review of the
legislative history of the federal statute.
1 25
The Doe opinion has been criticized as circumventing the true in-
tent of the federal statute, 126 which was designed to prevent introduction
of such highly prejudicial and inflammatory evidence against the com-
plainant.1 27 In considering this type of case under Oklahoma's statute, a
two-fold distinction between the federal statute and Oklahoma's statute
creates a definite possibility of this strategy of defense being successful in
Oklahoma. First, a detailed legislative history of the the federal statute
contradicts the Doe holding. 2 ' Second, the federal statute requires an in
camera hearing before trial to determine the relevancy of prior sexual
history. 2 9 Oklahoma's statute leaves this consideration to the discretion
120. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 provides that reputation or opinion evidence of the prior
sexual history of the complainant is inadmissible. Additionally, specific instance testimony is also
inadmissible, subject to three narrow exceptions: the source of semen or injury; where the victim has
engaged in sexual activity in the past with the defendant; and, where admission of the testimony is
constitutionally required. The federal statute explicitly mandates a procedure for notice of the use of
such testimony and requires the trial court to view the proposed evidence in an in camera proceeding
to make an admissibility determination. FED. R. EVID. 412.





126. Spector & Foster, Rule 412 and the Doe Case: The Fourth Circuit Turns Back the Clock, 35
OKLA L. REv. 87, 96 (1982).
127. See supra note 6.
128. See Spector & Foster, supra note 126, at 96-97. See also Privacy of Rape Victims: Hearings
on H.R. 14666 and Other Bills Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); 124 CONG. REC. 34,912-13 (1978); 124 CONG. REc. 36,255-57
(1978).
129. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(2).
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of the trial court.1 30
B. Source of Injury
The federal rape shield statute expressly permits the use of specific
instance testimony as it relates to the prior sexual history of the com-
plainant where there is a question as to the source of semen or injury.1 31
This provision allows the defendant to bring out the fact that the prose-
cutrix had engaged in prior sexual activity before the alleged rape. Thus,
the presence of semen or vaginal injury could not be conclusive evidence
of a rape. The absence of a similar provision in the Oklahoma statute is
cause for speculation by the courts. Oklahoma's restricted admission of
evidence only to instances where it relates to sexual conduct with or in
the presence of the accused, or where the prosecution introduces such
evidence,1 31 could mean that all other such evidence is inadmissible.
Clearly, such a prohibition would infringe upon an innocent defend-
ant's opportunity to vindicate himself. Oklahoma courts in the past have
permitted the introduction of such evidence for this very reason. In Self
v. State,133 the prosecution introduced evidence that the complainant's
hymen was torn as a result of being raped.13 The court then ruled that
the defendant had the right to show that the prosecutrix had relations
with another man at about the same time as the defendant.1 35 This evi-
dence would have accounted for her condition at the time of the alleged
rape.1 36 Arguably, by opening th door with such evidence, the prosecu-
tion enabled the defendant to offer rebuttal evidence under the third ex-
ception to the Oklahoma statute, 137 but, once again, without a clearer
mandate from the Oklahoma legislature, the extent to which such evi-
dence must be excluded or is required to be admitted is not certain.
An example of this point is the determination by the court in
Heavener v. State 3 to exclude such evidence. The defendant in
Heavener was convicted of repeatedly raping and sodomizing a woman
over a seven hour period.1 39 The complainant testified that she was not
130. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 750 (1981).
131. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(A).
132. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
133. 62 Okla. Crim. 208, 70 P.2d 1083 (1937).
134. Id. at 213, 70 P.2d at 1086.
135. Id. at 229, 70 P.2d at 1093.
136. Id.
137. The third exception permits the defendant to rebut evidence of the complainant's sexual
history when the prosecution introduces such evidence first. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 750(B) (1981).
138. 706 P.2d 905 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985).
139. Id. at 907.
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"emotionally involved" with any other men at the time of the rape,
although medical evidence indicated that she had had sexual relations
one week prior to the incident."4 While the appellate court agreed that
such evidence was irrelevant and designed to merely annoy or harass the
witness,14 1 the court's decision to hold the evidence inadmissible is not
based upon the statutory prohibition as much as it is on previous case
law. The court specifically cited Cameron v. State,142 a case with an
opinion based more on judicial creation than statutory interpretation.
143
C. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
Similar to circumstances where the determination of the source of
injury is in issue, where the prosecution "opens the door" by introducing
evidence that the rape victim was a virgin before the alleged rape, is the
question surrounding the use of a post traumatic stress disorder by the
prosecution. One such disorder is called Rape Trauma Syndrome,144 and
its admissibility at trial is a sharply divided issue among state courts.145
These state courts are wrestling with whether this type of evidence in-
vades the province of the jury14 1 or if it is even the type of evidence that
is scientifically accepted.' 47
The question in Oklahoma is not whether such evidence is admissi-
ble, but rather, if it is admissible, does Oklahoma's rape shield statute
preclude inquiry into the victim's prior sexual history when it may form
a basis for diagnosis? Dogs the use of Rape Trauma Syndrome by the
prosecution "open the door" for the defense to rebut this testimony?
This problem centers on the issue of consent.
Courts which have allowed expert testimony on Rape Trauma Syn-
drome have been careful to limit its use.' 48 In State v. Bressman, 49 the
court would not allow the expert to testify that the complainant, in the
140. Id. at 908.
141. Id.
142. 561 P.2d 118 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
143. See supra notes 109-115 and accompanying text.
144. Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 Am. J. PSYCH. 981 (1974).
145. Compare People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291 (1984)(error to admit rape
trauma counselor's testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome) with State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647
P.2d 1292 (1982)(psychiatrist's testimony that victim was suffering from Rape Trauma Syndrome
relevant and did not invade the province of the jury).
146. See State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, -, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982).
147. See State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d 12 (1987).
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expert's opinion, had been raped.150 Other courts have restricted the tes-
timony to comparing the symptoms of Rape Trauma Syndrome with the
symptoms of the victim."'
The potential for prejudice to the defendant is a relevant concern if a
post traumatic stress disorder is used by the prosecution to corroborate
the victim's contention of non-consent. In Oklahoma, the rape shield
statute precludes inquiry into the past sexual history of the complainant
where consent is in issue. 152 Thus, cross-examination of the expert wit-
ness may be limited by the statute, although the testimony of the expert
would be admissible. To avoid such a problem, Oklahoma's statute
should incorporate an in camera procedural provision 153 which would
mandate a pretrial determination of the extent of the expert's testimony.
This would prevent any spur of the moment determinations at trial, and
would help preserve the defendant's sixth amendment rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
Oklahoma's rape shield statute was passed to preclude from trial the
use of damaging prior sexual history evidence. This evidence was dam-
aging to the victim because it altered the focus of the trial from determin-
ing the guilt or innocence of the accused into an inquisition into her
morality. For the most part, Oklahoma courts have adhered to the spirit
of this statute; however, the inadequate draftsmanship of the statute has
the potential to force Oklahoma courts to judicially fashion exceptions to
guarantee the defendant's sixth amendment rights.
Specifically, the statute does not address how the courts should han-
dle cases in which the defendant asserts a reasonable belief of consent
based upon his knowledge of the victim's prior sexual history. Addition-
ally, there are no provisions which guide the courts when the defendant
claims bias or prejudicial motive by the complaining witness. Finally, if
a post traumatic stress disorder is introduced by the prosecution to cor-
roborate the victim's non-consent, the Oklahoma statute stands as an ex-
clusionary mandate, even though such testimony may be based upon the
prior sexual history of the complainant. If the Oklahoma legislature
wishes to protect the privacy of rape victims, then the statute should be
150. Id. at -, 689 P.2d at 907-08.
151. See People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 951-52 (Colo. 1987).
152. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 750 (1981).
153. See FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(2).
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redrafted to incorporate procedural in camera hearings and more clearly
delineate areas to be precluded from inquiry.
Stephen A. Kunzweiler
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